Does dance
depend? Or is it independent?
Today
I am reading through three essays on the (anti)choreomusical aesthetic of John
Cage and Merce Cunningham. The first two essays are from the “4 Statements on
the Dance” collection in Silence, and
as I mentioned in an earlier
post, I waited to finish the second two essays until I reached this point
in the project, when I got to “Where do We Go From Here?” This third essay
marks a transition in A Year From Monday
from statements on individual artists to the final large theoretical essays at
the end of the volume, which I’ll be tackling over the next few weeks (skipping
“Julliard Lecture,” which I covered in conjunction with its period-specific
texts here).
As I mentioned before, Cage did not compose a statement on Cunningham in the
same fashion as those of other artists in the inner sanctum of the
neo-avant-garde. True, he did write a series of mesostics on Cunningham in M, which hopefully I’ll get to in this
project, but these statements are in many ways, literally and figuratively,
deeply coded—for obvious reasons.
These
three statements outline the core tenants of the Cage/Cunningham (anti)choreomusical
aesthetic. In the earlier texts on the dance, we saw Cage move in a direction similar
to his compositional approach. Beginning with a temporal-mathematical
structure, Cage outlined duration for musical events to occur. In his earlier
works, the succession of musical noises or events were determined at times by
choice and others, such as First Construction
in Metal (1939), by a limiting procedure whereby a gamut of ideas, motives,
etc. occur; upon “discovering” the I-Ching, Cage then applied various
randomization procedures to the selection and succession of musical ideas, and
the rest is history.
From
this analytical perspective, one can note that duration, or large scale
ordering, remained paramount to the ontology of the musical artwork according
to Cage, and this structure formed the basis of Cage’s earlier approaches to
dance accompaniment, which I discussed in the earlier post. Blocks of time were
prearranged with the choreographer, whereby the music—anything that Cage felt
like composing—would fit within the pre-structured time lengths of the dance.
At this point, the notion of “accompaniment” became obscured, because the
choreomusical relationships were in general quite random. Following this, the
whole point of musical accompaniment started to fall apart, and Cage being
Cage, he and Cunningham embraced the idea that anything whatsoever could simultaneously happen concerning the sounds and the dance within the
timeframe of the work. Here we arrive at the Cage/Cunningham aesthetic: dance
and music simply occur at the same time in the same space, nothing more,
nothing less. The choreography is self-referential, intrinsic rather than
extrinsic, and the same for the sounds that occur in the space.
Dance
scholars and musicologists, such as two colleagues of mine, Daniel Callahan and
Paul Cox, have challenged this biographical narrative, citing archival evidence
that, in several cases, such as Credo in
US (1942) and Cheap Imitation
(1969, alongside Cunningham’s Second Hand),
Cage and Cunningham derived an explicit narrative internal and essential to the
work. In the latter case of Cheap
Imitation, this would seem to contradict the entire Cage/Cunningham aesthetic;
however, the volume of works that do adhere to the anti-choreomusical aesthetic
far outweigh these examples, and to dismiss their entire program because of a
few contradictions is something neither scholars have done. I am always
reminded of this wonderful short excerpt from the Cunningham repertoire,
accompanied by Satie, Septet, from
1953, a work as poignant and expressive as any choreography can be:
Thus
we have another very simple formulation that, like the negative aesthetic of
silence, is very tricky to parse. Dance and music occur at the same time,
nothing more, nothing less. “People and sounds interpenetrate.” Easy to
explain, much harder to understand. In contrast to Cage’s sounds-as-sounds
thesis, this one has a number of associative problems that the human mind
rarely gets over, and I believe this was built in to the anti-choreomusical
aesthetic. The term I’ve mentioned before, synchresis, coined by Michel Chion
in his writings on film sound, is relevant here. Synchresis is the “indelible
weld” that occurs between sound and image on the screen, and the associative
mind immediately, and perhaps instinctually, associates an action with its
concurrent sound, even if the sound has little to do with a sound that would
occur in reality. Sound designers take advantage of this phenomena by utilizing
a wide variety of objects to create sound effects on a Foley stage—think of pumpkins
and wood being smashed to mimic someone being punched, when in real life a
punch is usually accompanied by an anticlimactic and generally inaudible soft
thud.
In
terms of choreomusical relationships, especially when the music is music as
defined by Cage, the happenstance moments when sound and
action correspond immediately set the mind to making associations. Cage, and
Cunningham, would kindly ask that we ignore these moments, but in the end, this
is an instinctual response, one closely related to the fight or flight instinct
deep in the oldest recesses of our troublesome craniums, and it simply will not
go away. This is where the Cage/Cunningham aesthetic really shines: if we
really do celebrate these instinctual responses, rather than think about them,
we can truly appreciate the multimedia audiovisual haptic and kinesthetic artwork
that is the Cage/Cunningham dance experience. In this case it is all about instinct, not
intellect, that we are reveling in. The mind jumps to make associations, and we
let it, we just don’t think about it or assume it means anything.
This
is the idea that is gradually developed in these three essays, I believe. In
the first, written in 1956, Cage begins by taking the easy way out, by defining
the “meaning” of the Cage/Cunningham experience in absolute terms:
We are not, in
these dances and music, saying something. We are simple-minded enough to think
that if we were saying something we would use words. We are rather doing
something…there are no stories and no psychological problems. There is simply
an activity of movement, sound, and light…the activity of movement, sound, and
light, we believe, is expressive, but what it expresses is determined by each
one of you—who is right, as Pirandello’s title has it, if he thinks he is.
Here
Cage is referring to Pirandello’s 1917 play, Right You Are! (If You Think So), which aptly summarizes the solipsistic
or skeptical argument in philosophy: We cannot know what is going on in anyone
else’s mind, ever, and thus the problems of philosophy, of the mind, meaning,
or interpretation are all internal, a battle within ourselves, played out in
jumbled words, jumbled blog posts, polemics, aesthetics, idealism, politics,
etc.
Cage
realized quickly that he should probably avoid the term “expressive,” and thus
the latter two essays speak in even more vague terms about the ontology of the
Cage/Cunningham artwork, and the other fun problem of philosophy: how do we
define the indefinable? The answer according to Cage, as I have discussed, is
through negation: we define it according to its opposite. In the interim essay,
“2 Pages, 122 Words on Music and Dance,” Cage takes recourse to a version of
the sounds-as-sounds thesis: we look directly to the object, whether it is a
sound or an action, and define it according to itself, and nothing else:
[this
is an approximation of the beautiful layout of the text]
To obtain the
value
of a sound, a
movement,
measure from
zero. (Pay A
bird flies.
attention to
what it is,
just as it
is.)
……
movement
sound
Points in Activities
which are different
time, in love happen in a time which is a
space:
space mirth are each
central, original.
the heroic
wonder
The emotions tranquility are in the audience
fear
anger The
telephone rings.
sorrow
disgust Each person
is in the best seat.
So
at this point the recourse is to the intrinsic, to the associations within the
mind, whatever they may be, that keeps the thinking mind thinking. If we follow
Cage, and accept the actions just for what they are—moments in time, unique to
the occasion and irreproducible—then we have come that much closer to the great
ideal of philosophy, the thing-in-itself, or in Cage’s terms “nature in her
manner of operation,” that prickly elusive thing we just never seem to be able
to grasp with our feeble minds. This is not necessarily the best way to go,
because as I mentioned before, time and again philosophy has argued for and
against such an ideal, and in the end it is nearly always concluded that this
ideal is just that, an impossibility; at some point we are going to fall back
on our habits and start thinking of relationships between things, ideas,
objects, sounds, movement, etc.
So,
Cage asks us in the third essay, “Where Do We Go From Here?” More than any
other writer on music in the twentieth century, Cage phrases his ideas in the
form of a question, opening up the debate and sending the mind spinning, and at
this point, my mind is spinning. Where do
we go from here? Where are we going? Are sounds just sounds, or are they
Beethoven?
Cage
opens the essay with the quote at the beginning of this post: “Does dance
depend? Or is it independent?” He follows with another formulation of the “sound
field” thesis, which is integral to the sounds-as-sounds ideal, and quickly
rushes through a host of ideas relating the Cage/Cunningham aesthetic to,
suddenly, politics. This is a strong undercurrent in the latter half of A Year From Monday, and it really peaks
in M, when Cage seemingly moves to
leftist extremes. This is really not a surprising turn, for Cage’s negative
aesthetics ultimately led to the one real political confrontation that the arts
have been dealing with in the latter half of the 20th century and
beyond: now that we opened the door for the “what is art” question, the step
many people began to take was: “what do we pay for, or support, and what is its
value?” Naturally any artist scoffs at this question, but it was and is a very
real question, one that highlights the dirty connection between arts, commerce,
and politics. And it’s not going away any time soon.
In
between these political wranglings (which are footnoted, yet the footnoted
material is placed in line with the text rather than at the bottom of the page)
is an interesting elaboration on the sound-as-sounds thesis, emerging from the
sound field idea, toward what Cage calls a “space-time arts.” Sound is
ostensibly just a vibration within a space, audible to the human ear, and thus
space, environment, and architecture are included in this conception of a new
kind of art, one more in line with multimedia, or, in the popular sixties term “Intermedia.”
On the last page of the essay, after recounting his famous anecdote of the
first time he met Morton Feldman (which seems a bit out of place considering
the context), Cage highlights an important new direction for the Cage/Cunningham
anti-choreomusical aesthetic, one he would discover in about a year:
We’re no
longer satisfied with flooding the air with sound from a public-address system.
We insist upon something more luminous and transparent so that sounds will
arise at any point in the space bringing about the surprises we encounter when
we walk in the woods or down the city streets. Thus music is becoming a dance
in its own right and has, of course, new notations.
Cage
is referring here to a project that he started in 1962 with the sculptor
Richard Lippold, who was commissioned by Pan American Airlines to construct
several sculptures in its new high-tech, glossy behemoth corporate headquarters
in Midtown Manhattan, the infamous Pan Am Building (later bought out and
renamed the MetLife Building). Lippold, a close friend of Cage for many years
(and about whom I have written extensively in other contexts), tossed out an
idea to the architects to commission Cage for lobby music rather than utilizing
the dreaded Muzak that Cage famously scorned (as I discussed HERE).
To his surprise they accepted the proposal, and Cage began work on perhaps one
of the first commercial sound installation sculptures. He proposed that the
floor be embedded with contact sensors that would cue a large sound system of
prerecorded sounds from the environment—a far cry from Muzak and a wonderful
idea far ahead of its time. However, once he started discussing the idea with
engineers and architects, they realized the project would be far too costly,
and far too avant-garde for the guys upstairs, and they went for the Muzak.
Corporate America: 1 Cage: 0 (but who’s counting at this point, really).
However,
the project did spark something in Cage. He was in the midst of his infamous “Variations”
series at the time, and many point to Variations
IV, which premiered the following year, as a major turning point. In
addition, the idea of using contact microphones and sensors to cue electronic
equipment opened up a new direction for the Cage/Cunningham choreomusical
aesthetic. So, in a sense Cage was on the cusp of answering his own question.
Where do we go from here? Here: